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The resistible rise of international authority

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Disclaimer

This working paper is based on the interventions on the conference “Europe at the Cross-Roads: Challenges of the EU for National Politics” held at Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, in October 15, 2018, a partnership between Institute of Public Policy, MAPLE, and FLAD. Around four in five IOs have experienced change in their structure of authority—delegation, pooling, or both—in the years that we observe them. What can explain the stark differences in the extent to which IOs change over time? We theorize that an IO’s authority is responsive to two distinct pressures: a functional pressure arising from change in an IO’s policy portfolio, and a political pressure in which IO authority is swept up and contained in public debate. We test these, and alternative, arguments using original data on international authority in 76 international governmental organizations over the period 1950–2010.

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Introduction

We detect a remarkable deepening of international authority in the postwar period.¹ Sixty-one percent of the IOs that we observe from 1950 (or later) to 2010 saw an increase in both pooling and delegation (33 IOs) or in one or the other (13 IOs). No IO experienced a decrease in both pooling and delegation, and just seven underwent a decrease in either pooling or delegation and no increase in the other.²

Under what circumstances will states delegate authority to non-state actors? When will states pool authority in binding majoritarian voting? Our theory is that international authority reflects two contrary pressures, one functional and one social.

The functional pressure results from an IO's policy commitments. As an IO extends its policy commitments, so it acquires the machinery of complex decision-making. The intuition here is that the broader the range of an organization's policy portfolio the greater the functional pressure to structure its agenda, marshal information, resolve disputes, and manage decision making. The result is that supranationalism arises as functional adaptation to policy complexity. The IO retains its inter-national character in that the member states negotiate its institutions, but in doing, so states are induced to facilitate decision making by pooling authority among themselves and by turning over some key functions to independent actors.

A functional logic provides both an explanation of the overall trend towards greater IO authority over the past decades and the core of an explanation for the variation that we detect. However, functional adaptation is not the end of the story because the authority of an IO is not an inert outcome. Authoritative international governance may generate a sharp reaction among those opposed to immigration, trade, and the loss of national sovereignty (Hooghe and Marks 2018a).³ Functional pressures may meet a wall of resistance when an IO enters the domain of domestic political conflict.

The critique from the left is that international governance insulates globalization from democratic rules that protect jobs and the environment. The nationalist critique, and the most potent source of resistance today, is that international governance is illegitimate because it undermines national self-rule and national culture. Those who conceive their national identity in exclusive terms, as "us versus them," resist supranationalism as rule by foreigners. As an IO extends its authority and salience in domestic politics, so governments may think twice about going along with functional pressures. This effect arises as a consequence of politicization—the salience and divisiveness of debate over an IO—and we hypothesize that it has curbed supranationalism. Politicization is a key constraint on functional adaptation and arguably it is the chief reason why we do not live in a world of progressively deeper supranational governance.

¹ This ms. is forthcoming as a chapter in a book, entitled *A Theory of International Organization*, by Liesbet Hooghe, Tobias Lenz, and Gary Marks (OUP). The estimates on delegation and pooling in 76 IOs (1950-2010) are publicly available (Measurement of International Authority – MIA: <https://gwmarks.web.unc.edu>

or <https://hooghe.web.unc.edu>; Hooghe et al. (2017)). We are grateful for funding provided by the European Union's ERC Advanced Grant on Causes and Consequences of Multilevel Governance (No. 249543) and by The European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme EUENGAGE: "Bridging the gap between public opinion and European leadership: engaging a dialogue on the future path of Europe" (No. 649281).

² We register change if there is an absolute shift of 0.01 or greater on a 0-1 scale from the first to last year of an IO in the dataset.

³ This argument builds on a growing literature that investigates the politicization of IOs. See e.g. Conceição-Heldt 2013; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2009b; Hurrelmann and Schneider 2015; Kay 2015; Mansfield and Mutz 2012; Morgenstern et al. 2007; Rathbun 2012; Rixen and Zangl 2013; Solingen 2008; Zürn 2004; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012.

The model we propose combines an analysis of the development of the policy portfolio laid out in Chapter 5 with the effects of the policy portfolio and politicization for IO authority in this chapter. Figure 6.1 summarizes these expectations by placing policy scope in a causal chain beginning with community. Community—the extent to which an IO encompasses normatively similar participants—underpins diffuse reciprocity and provides the basis for member states to engage in highly incomplete contracting. Highly incomplete contracting opens the door to an expanding policy portfolio, which as we argue in this chapter, incentivizes the pooling and delegation of IO authority. Rather than conceive norms and functional pressures as alternative explanations of international governance, we theorize a sequential process in which the normative basis of contracting among states determines the growth of the policy portfolio, and the functional pressures arising from the policy portfolio determine the course of IO authority. Finally, IO authority evokes rising politicization because it enhances supranational shared rule at the expense of national self- rule.

[Figure 6.1: A model of international authority]

1. Policy expansion

In the previous chapter, we demonstrate that community—shared norms that undergird diffuse reciprocity—are vital for the incomplete contracting that underpins policy expansion. Here we take the argument one step further to theorize how policy expansion affects the authority of an international organization. Our argument is that as the policy portfolio of an IO expands, so there are pressures to empower non-state actors and facilitate majoritarian decision making among the member states. This hypothesis is a special case of the more general claim that “More prevalent and complex political activity places growing demands on decision makers [...] and [enhances] the need to delegate decisions” (Pierson 2000: 483). There is abundant evidence for this functional logic in the development of national states and the expansion of civil services, courts, and agencies. Summarizing the findings of the literature on delegation within the state, Moe (2012: 17) observes that “In complex policy areas, the value of agency [...] will tend to be higher, and the optimal level of independence higher.” In the field of international governance we hypothesize a functional logic of empowerment in the following four mechanisms:

- Moral hazard. Pooling authority in majoritarian decision making alleviates a moral hazard—veto blackmail—that becomes more severe as an IO’s policy scope expands.
- Issue cycling. Delegation of agenda setting to non-state actors constrains issue cycling under majority voting as the dimensionality of the policy space increases.
- Information. The informational benefits of independent non-state expertise increase with the extent of an IO’s policy portfolio.
- Dispute settlement. Policy expansion increases the demand for institutionalized monitoring of state compliance.

These mechanisms underpin the expectation that as an IO comes to have a broader policy footprint, it will find it useful to extend majority voting and empower non- state actors. There is no subterfuge involved. International authority in this theory results from the decisions of the member states themselves, not merely from the efforts of non- state actors to work around member states or extend member state “slack.” International authority is a matter of political choice as well as economic efficiency, and this as we now suggest, has a distinctive logic.

2. Politicization

Politicization—the salience and divisiveness of debate over an IO—can constrain international authority even in the face of functional pressure.⁴ Functional pressures operate best where decision making is sheltered from political conflict, and where as a result, efficiency rather than power shapes decision making. However, international authority touches on a human nerve—who rules our community—and this may generate intense political conflict that can stifle concerns about the functional benefits of scale. The guiding assumption that connects such conflict to decision making about international authority is that national governments are motivated to sustain their own political survival, and hence their performance in national elections. As the authority of an IO becomes embroiled in domestic political conflict, so the concern of the government is redirected to the consequences of its actions for its domestic popularity. When push comes to shove, domestic politics trumps economic efficiency.

An individual's attitude over international authority depends on how they conceive themselves in relation to others. How do they conceive the communities to which they belong, who is included; who is excluded; who has a right to rule? The functional virtue of international governance—shared rule to enhance collective problem solving—can be a domestic political liability because it challenges the claim that states alone have legitimacy to exercise authority within their domain. This can cause deep resentment on the part of those who feel that transnationalism produces economic insecurity, who are fearful of immigration, and who regard international authority as the rule of foreigners.

The politicization of international governance is, in principle, agnostic about whether it promotes or depresses supranationalism.⁵ In the early years of European integration, it was possible to believe that mass publics would press for more supranational integration as its benefits filtered into their lives (Inglehart 1970; Schmitter 1969). However, the observed effect of politicization has been negative. As one might expect, the predominant response has been a reaction on the part of those who feel that they suffer the consequences of jurisdictional shocks that challenge established loyalties and ways of life.

Politicization was discovered in the European Union, but the phenomenon appears to be more general.⁶ Its effects have been detected in the United States, Latin America, and in several global IOs. Solingen and Malnight (2016) make the general argument that government leaders respond to globalization by crafting coalitions that enhance their political support. Where an “inward-looking” coalition of import-competing industries, unskilled workers, and nationalist or religious movements is predominant, government leaders will oppose regional cooperation.

⁴ The notion that politicization implies contestation as well as rising salience and widening involvement is well established in EU studies (De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke 2017; Hooghe and Marks 1999, 2009b; Hutter and Grande 2014; Kriesi et al. 2008; Schmitter 1969).

⁵ Zürn (2018: 137-169) characterizes politicization as “a double-edged sword.” While it can broaden the foundation of IO legitimation by complementing a technocratic narrative with considerations about fairness and participation, it may also expose gaps between what contestants desire and IOs can provide. This may, ultimately, undermine IO authority.

⁶ On politicization in the EU, see Bartolini 2005; Bornschier 2018; Börzel 2016; Copelovitch, Frieden, and Walter 2016; Curtice 2017; De Vries 2018; De Vries and Hobolt 2018; De Wilde et al. 2016; Diez- Medrano 2003; Evans 1999; Evans et al. 2017; Grande and Hutter 2016; Grande and Kriesi. 2016;

Grande and Schwarzbözl 2017; Green-Pedersen 2012; Hobolt 2016; Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Höglinger 2016; Hooghe and Marks 1999, 2001, 2009b; 2018b; Hurrelmann et al. 2015; Hutter 2014; Hutter et al. 2016; Kriesi et al. 2008; Kleider and Stoeckel. 2018; Kuhn 2015; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Kuhn et al. 2016; Laffan 2016a, 2016b; McNamara 2015; Marks 1999; Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Piattoni 2010; Polk et al. 2017; Polyakova and Fligstein 2016; Prosser 2016; Risse 2010; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016; Saurugger 2016; Schimmelfennig 2014, 2018a, 2018b; Van Elsas 2016; Van Kersbergen and De Vries 2007; Zürn 2012.

Politicization around the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) appears to have had a powerful anticipatory effect in constraining subsequent international governance. At the time it was negotiated, from the summer of 1991, NAFTA became “an enormous political issue” dividing both major political parties in the United States (Mayer 1998: 5). Organized labor and environmental NGOs pressured Democratic party candidates, and populist conservatives, supporting Buchanan, pressured Republicans (Bow 2015: 41). The contract that was negotiated had clear, highly complete, terms minimizing delegation to non-state actors, and deflecting the accusation that it was “part of a skeletal structure for world government” (Buchanan 1993). The lesson was apparently learned by both the Clinton and Bush administrations: “large scale politicization in the late 1980s and early 1990s had the effect of discouraging political elites from pursuing further integration initiatives, and this in turn made politicization recede” (Hurrelmann and Schneider 2015: 255).

In Latin America, there is evidence that Mercosur, the Andean Community, Caricom, and SICA have seen bouts of politicization (Hoffmann 2015). This has been linked to a shift to “intergovernmental agreements rather than institutionalized treaties or supranational institutions” (Riggirozzi 2015: 240). Recent agreements in energy, food security, culture, finance and banking, social development, health care and education are relatively complete contracts that involve little or no pooling or delegation.

Several global international organizations have contended with politicization, inducing them to alter their legitimation narratives, adjust policy, or adopt institutional reforms. The World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, in particular, have been the target of contestation (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2017). The WTO is perhaps the extreme case, for it has generated politicization from both the radical left and the nationalist right. Leftist opposition has focused on democracy and the environment, as in Seattle in 1999 when tens of thousands of activists chanting “no globalization without representation!” broke up a ministerial WTO meeting (Munck 2007: 60). In recent years, opposition has been most intense on part of nationalists, particularly in the U.S. who believe that the WTO’s appellate body encroaches on national sovereignty, and that “member states rather than unelected appeal judges should decide ambiguous or contentious issues and that it is wrong for the appellate body to establish precedents for future cases” (Elliot: 2018).

These cases suggest that politicization is not a uniquely European phenomenon, and that member states will be less willing to empower an IO to the extent it is subject to domestic contestation. This expectation has a strong theoretical rationale, but it has not been tested using comparative data. We need now to explain how we measure the key variables in our explanation.

3. Dependent variables

Delegation—scaled from zero to one—is an annual measure of the authority of independent non-state bodies in an IO’s decision-making process. Figure 6.2 summarizes each IO’s development from its first to last year in the dataset, and while delegation has increased overall, this trend has been far from uniform. The left panel depicts IOs that experienced a substantial net increase in delegation in the period 1950 to 2010. The right panel reveals that six IOs, including the United Nations and UNESCO, saw decreases in delegation.⁷ Seven IOs move more than 0.3 points on the 0-1 scale, and all are general purpose IOs. This is what one might expect to find if change in delegation is sensitive to expansion of the policy portfolio. As we show in chapter 5, a general purpose IO, i.e. an IO with a highly incomplete contract, tends to have an expanding policy portfolio.⁸

[Figure 6.2: Change in delegation (1950-2010)]

Pooling taps the extent to which authoritative control is taken out of the hands of individual states by majoritarian voting in collective state decision making, which we weight by the bindingness of decisions and ratification procedures which allow individual states to escape collective decisions. The increase in pooling has been less pronounced as that in delegation.

Figure 6.3 shows the net change in pooling for 76 IOs. Five IOs move up more than 0.3 points on the 0-1 scale, and an additional ten grow by 0.15 or more. All but two of the fastest growing IOs are general purpose. Twelve IOs end with a lower pooling score than at the start, including the World Health Organization (0.14), the International Civil Aviation Organization (0.06) and the International Monetary Fund (0.06).

[Figure 6.3: Change in pooling]

⁷ UNESCO’s Executive Board was originally composed of experts who served “on behalf of the Conference as a whole and not as representatives of their respective governments.” However, member states implemented reforms that restricted the independence of board members, and by 1991, the Board was composed exclusively of national delegates (Finnemore 1993; Sewell 1975).

⁸ By 2010 or the final year in the dataset, general purpose IOs had competence in 14.2 policies on average.

4. Independent variables

Policy scope estimates the legal, financial, and organizational basis of an IO's policy portfolio assessed for each of twenty-five policies. We use eight indicators outlined in the Appendix.

Politicization estimates the salience and divisiveness of debate over an IO. It refers to “a process whereby the technocratic behind-the-closed-doors logic of decisions and decision-making processes in and about international institutions ... is challenged” (Zürn 2012: 52). Media coverage of protests directed at an IO is an accessible indicator for contestation around an IO, and it is plausible that such coverage constrains a government's willingness to deepen the authority of the IO in question (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005; Tarrow 2005). We use an algorithm developed by Tallberg et al. (2014) for annual media coverage of protests/demonstrations directed at an IO in the Lexis-Nexis database.⁹

Finally, we control for several variables that analysts have noted as possibly having an effect on delegation or pooling:

- Democracy on the premise that democratic rulers are less fearful of supranational authority than authoritarian rulers (Risse-Kappen 1995; Simmons 2009).
- Power asymmetry on the ground that powerful states can be expected to oppose international authority because they prefer informal, “me-first,” arrangements in which they can impose their preferences (Abbott and Snidal 2000: 448; Grieco 1990; Krasner 1976; Mattli 1999).
- The number of IO member states because the incentive to delegate or pool authority may increase as the transaction costs of negotiation and the costs of disagreement rise with the size of an IO's membership (Hawkins et al. 2006; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001: 789; Pollack 2003).
- Affluence on the premise that wealthier populations transact more across national borders and have an incentive to diminish the transaction costs of international governance.
- A year counter to pick up the effect of an omitted variable that might produce an incremental increase in IO authority over time.
- Core state powers on the expectation that the willingness of member states to cede authority is curbed by the sovereignty costs of collaboration which are particularly high in areas related to defense and security (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016; Kono 2007; Snidal 1985; Stein 1982).

⁹ Politicization is calculated as a three-year moving average of the number of mentions that combine the words protestor or demonstrator with the IO name (see Appendix). The measure is quite strongly correlated with an estimate of the salience of an IO derived from a count of references to the IO in Google ($r = 0.75$).

5. Evidence for the effect of policy expansion and politicization

We analyze seventy-six international organizations from the year they were set up (or 1950) to 2010. All models estimate fixed effects to gauge change over time using one-year lags for independent variables. Table 6.1 begins with base models predicting delegation and pooling respectively by the number of IO policies in the previous year and a three-year moving average of politicization with the full range of controls and a year count to address pressures of time in an unbalanced panel.

Policy scope and Politicization are robust predictors of Delegation and Pooling over time. We find this under all combinations of controls including the fully specified models.¹⁰ The models in Table 6.1 account for around 41 percent of the variance in change in Delegation and 25 percent of the variance in change in Pooling. Pooling is more sluggish than Delegation, and it is cross-sectionally dominated.¹¹ Both functionalist and postfunctionalist pressures appear to shape international authority within IOs over time. An expanding policy portfolio induces states to increase delegation and pooling, while politicized debate operates the opposite direction. The estimate for the effect of an increase in the number of policies handled by an IO is significant at the 0.01 level in predicting change in Delegation and Pooling. Politicization has a negative effect that is significant at the 0.05 level for Delegation and at the 0.01 level for Pooling.

[Table 6.1 about here: change in delegation and pooling]

The substantive effects of a changing policy portfolio are sizeable. Holding all controls at their means, a shift in an IO's policy portfolio by five policies (equivalent to a one standard deviation shift) changes delegation by 0.08 on the 0-1 scale and pooling by 0.05. A 0.08 increase in delegation is equivalent to setting up an independent arbitration system that is compulsory for all member states and can pronounce binding judgments unless a collective state body overrules. The same increase could result from extending a general secretariat's agenda powers to two or three additional decision areas. A 0.05 increase in pooling is equivalent to introducing a binding budget that is adopted by simple majority at the agenda stage and consensus in the final stage. Or it could mean introducing an accession procedure that requires consensus in a collective state body but no ratification.

The substantive effects of politicization are smaller: an additional 40 media reports of IO protests (equivalent to a one standard deviation move on politicization) affects delegation by 0.005 and pooling by 0.01. But note that this effect is net of powerful controls.

It is worth noting that we are modeling legislated reform in delegation and pooling, that is, reform that is negotiated among the member states themselves. Hence, our findings do not engage the possibility that IO bureaucrats exploit gaps in state control to extend their own agency (Johnson 2014). This makes what we do find all the more noteworthy for it is one thing

¹⁰ These are in the online Appendix. Democracy is significant at the 0.1 level in the base model for Pooling, but not for Delegation. None of the remaining controls, except the year count, reaches statistical significance.

¹¹ Chapter 7 accounts for cross-sectional variance in Pooling.

to say that supranationalism grows because non-state actors are able to informally exploit gaps in state control, and quite another to find that states themselves contractually agree to convey authority to non-state actors and pool authority in binding majoritarian decision making. The authority estimated in our models is formally negotiated, explicitly documented, and consequently costly to change. It does not arise merely as an unintentional gap in state control.

6. A two-stage model

Our theory conceives IO authority as the result of a two-step process in which the scope of an IO's policy portfolio is both a predictor and an outcome (Figure 6.1). In the first step, change in the policy scope of an IO reflects the normative commonalities among its members and the incompleteness with which they contract governance. The premise is that norms shape the possibilities for international governance which one can observe when states contract an IO and as policy portfolio of the IO changes over time.

In the second step, the authority of the IO responds to its policy scope and the extent to which the IO is caught up in public contestation. The claim here is that the normative basis of an IO has functionalist consequences for collective decision making among the member states and the authority that they delegate to non-state actors. This is tempered by the unwillingness of a government to empower an IO that is the target of domestic political contestation.

[Table 6.2: two-stage model]

A parsimonious way to model this is through a two-stage fixed effects model that instruments Contract and Community for Policy scope. Table 6.2 reports the second-stage results for delegation and pooling respectively. In both equations, instrumented Policy scope is significantly associated with change in both Delegation ($p=0.0001$) and Pooling ($p=0.007$). Instrumental estimation is almost always less efficient than ordinary least squares estimation (Bartels 1991), but here the loss in statistical power is negligible. The F- statistics for the instrumented models in Table 6.2 (6.67 and 5.73, respectively) are only slightly weaker than the F-statistic for the fixed effects models in Table 6.1 (6.86 and 6.36 respectively).

Separate analyses (online Appendix) show that Contract and Community are strong instruments which are well correlated with Policy scope, as corroborated by the Kleibergen-Paap and Stock-Yogo tests. This satisfies the assumption that the selected instruments are relevant. The Sargan-Hansen test conducted in conjunction with the second-stage model suggests that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term of the equation with instrumented policy scope. This gives us confidence that our theory is capturing something that exists in the real world.

7. Conclusion

Forty-six of seventy-six IOs we observe in this book experienced an increase in delegated authority to non-state actors or took on majoritarian voting rules in member state decision making. The period 1950 to 2010 was an era of remarkable deepening of international governance.

This chapter explains how this happened and why some IOs deepened their authority while others did not. Our explanation ties together the normative conditions of international cooperation, the subsequent development of the policy portfolio, the political resistance that might arise, and the authoritative competencies of the IO.

The evidence presented here confirms that an IO's authority is responsive to two forces: a functional pressure arising from change in an IO's policy portfolio, and a political reaction in which IO authority is swept up and constrained in public debate. Our expectation about the portfolio effect is grounded in a literature on decisional complexity and organizational design. It suggests that a growing policy portfolio produces an incentive to limit the ability of any one actor to exercise a veto and an incentive to delegate authority to independent actors who can frame the agenda, provide information, and adjudicate conflicts.

This line of argument might lead one to expect a process of ever-deepening supranationalism among general purpose IOs, most of which have expanding policy portfolios. However, we theorize a contending effect arising from the politicization of international governance and the mobilization of demands for national self-rule. Politicization strips away the protective blanket of permissive consensus which exists when domestic publics trust their governments to do the right thing. It thrusts international governance into domestic politics and so challenges the causal priority of functional pressures.

In order to test these expectations, we implement fixed effects models with a range of controls for alternative explanations. Evidence that we and others have collected confirms the effect of both change in an IO's policy portfolio and politicization. In addition, two-stage models confirm our broader claim that IO authority depends on the growth of the policy portfolio which in turn depends on the incompleteness of an IO's foundational contract and the normative coherence of its member states.

In concluding, it is worth considering the scope conditions. The evidence we have produced comes from observing IOs in the decades following World War II. From a long- historical perspective this might be considered an N of 1. The force of this concern is intensified because the politicization that we detect up to 2010 has gathered strength. It has come to structure political conflict in several liberal democracies including the United States. This relates domestic contestation to the entire structure of international governance alongside the fate of particular international organizations. The logic of the theory set out here is that politicization—expressed in the demand for national self-rule— may challenge the normative basis for international governance even if the benefits of scale in the provision of public goods remain persuasive.

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Appendix

Table 6.1: Explaining change in delegation and pooling

	DV=Change in delegation	DV=Change in pooling
Policy scopet-1	0.015*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
Politicizationt-1	0.011** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.006)
R2 within	0.412	0.255
AIC	10860	10268
F-statistic (sign. at 0.0001 level)	6.86	6.36

Note: N =3199 IO-year (76 IOs) for 1950-2010. The dependent variables *Change in delegation* and *Change in pooling* vary between -1 and +1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed effects estimations with robust standard errors clustered by IO and under controls (democracy, members, power asymmetry, affluence, core state powers, year count).

Table 6.2: A two-stage model explaining change in delegation and pooling

	DV=Change in delegation	DV=Change in pooling
Policy scopet-1 instrumented (instruments: community, contract)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.006)
Politicizationt-1	0.014* (0.007)	0.021*** (0.006)
R2 within	0.333	0.202
AIC	10454	10048
F-statistic (sign. at 0.0001 level)	6.67	5.73

Note: N =3199 IO-year (76 IOs) for 1950-2010. The dependent variables *Change in delegation* and *Change in pooling* vary between -1 and +1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-stage fixed effects resulting from an instrumental variable approach that instruments policy scope with community dynamic and contract dynamic; robust standard errors clustered by IO and full controls.

Figure 6.1: A model of international authority






Figure 6.2: Change in delegation by IO (1950-2010)



Note: N=76 IOs. The boxes show for each IO how much delegation has changed from the first to the last year. The left panel shows IOs for which delegation has increased by 0.05 or more; the right panel shows IOs for which delegation has decreased, remained the same, or increased marginally.

Figure 6.3: Change in pooling by IO (1950-2010)



Note: N=76 IOs. The boxes show for each IO how much pooling has changed from the first to the last year. The left panel shows IOs for which pooling has increased; the right panel shows IOs for which pooling has decreased or remained the same.

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